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Abstract 
Visual long-term memory can store thousands of objects with surprising visual detail, but 
just how detailed are these representations and how can we quantify this fidelity? Using 
the property of color as a case study, we estimated the precision of visual information in 
long-term memory, and compared this to the precision of the same information in 
working memory. Observers were shown real-world objects in a random color, and then 
ask to recall the color after a delay. We quantified two parameters of performance: the 
variability of internal representations of color (fidelity) and the probability of forgetting 
an object’s color altogether. Surprisingly, the data show that the fidelity of color 
information in long-term memory was comparable to the asymptotic precision of working 
memory. These results suggest that a common limit may constrain both long-term 
memory and working memory, such as a bound on the fidelity required to retrieve 
memory representations. FIDELITY OF VISUAL MEMORY     3 
 
  A large body of work has demonstrated that visual long-term memory is capable 
of storing thousands of objects with significant detail (Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, Oliva, 
2008; Konkle, Brady, Alvarez & Oliva, 2010a, 2010b; Hollingworth, 2004, 2005). 
However, long-term memory fidelity has been examined in only a qualitative way. For 
example, Brady et al. (2008) demonstrated that, after seeing thousands of objects, 
observers succeeded at subtle object-exemplar discriminations (e.g., which of two 
chocolate cakes were seen) or object-state discriminations (whether the cake was half 
eaten or 2/3
rds eaten). But the information observers must store to recognize the amount of 
cake is difficult to quantify and compare across timescales and items. So several 
fundamental questions remain unanswered: Just how detailed is visual long-term 
memory? And how does this compare to the detail contained in visual working-memory 
or the precision of perception? 
Determining the precision of long-term memory places significant constraints on 
models of memory in general, and is particularly relevant for understanding the 
relationship between working memory and long-term memory. For example, if working 
memory and long-term memory have similar fidelity, then it is important to consider 
unified explanations for the limit on fidelity (e.g., fidelity-dependent retrieval limits), as 
opposed to system-specific limitations (e.g., the amount of "slots" or "resources" 
available to working memory; Zhang & Luck, 2008; Wilken & Ma, 2004).   Thus, 
comparing working memory and long-term memory can not only help elucidate the 
underlying memory representation of visual objects (Brady, Konkle & Alvarez, 2011), 
but also clarify the extent to which these two stores rely upon shared representations and 
processes (McElree, 2006; Nairne, 2002; Jonides et al. 2008). FIDELITY OF VISUAL MEMORY     4 
 
  Previous attempts to quantify the fidelity of long-term memory representations 
used simple stimuli like oriented gratings (Magnussen & Dyrnes, 1994; Magnussen et al. 
2003). However, this work may depend on memory for decision criteria rather than 
perceptual features of the objects-to-be-remembered (Lages & Treisman, 1998; Lages & 
Paul, 2006; Magnussen, 2009).  In addition, while oriented gratings define a well-
characterized space within which to quantify fidelity, these stimuli are not suited to the 
strengths of long-term memory, which is best studied using meaningful stimuli like real-
world objects (Konkle et al., 2010). Thus little is known about how detailed visual long-
term memory representations can be with real-world, semantically-rich objects. 
  Here, we take a psychophysical approach to quantify the fidelity of visual long-
term memory for objects. We use color as a case study because the color of objects can 
be manipulated in a continuous space, which allows us to extend the continuous report 
paradigm used in visual working memory (Wilken & Ma, 2004) to long-term memory. 
Furthermore, there are metrics that allow separable measurements of the fidelity of color 
memory independent of guessing (Zhang & Luck, 2008; Bays, Catalao & Husain, 2009). 
Finally, previous work has shown that continuous report metrics do not seem to depend 
on verbal memory (Zhang & Luck, 2008) and that results with color generalize to shape 
(Zhang & Luck, 2008) and orientation (Anderson, Vogel & Awh, 2011). Thus, we can 
quantify how accurately observers remember the features of a given object after seeing 
hundreds of objects, and how likely they are to completely fail to retrieve a feature. 
We find that from perception to working memory, observers lose significant 
precision in their representation of objects’ color. As more items are added to working 
memory, the fidelity of these memory representations reaches an asymptotic limit, and FIDELITY OF VISUAL MEMORY     5 
 
surprisingly, this limit is almost identical to the fidelity of representations we find in 
long-term memory.  These results suggest that a common limit may be at work in both 
visual working memory and long-term memory: the asymptotic fidelity observed in 
visual working memory may not be a consequence of a slot-like architecture (Zhang & 
Luck, 2008, 2009; Anderson, Vogel & Awh, 2011) or a limited pool of resources (Wilken 
& Ma, 2004; Bayes, Catalao, & Husain, 2009); rather, the fidelity of visual working 
memory may reflect a more general upper bound on how noisy a memory representation 
can be before it is unable to be retrieved.  
 
EXPERIMENT 1A AND 1B 
Observers performed a continuous color report task on pictures of real-world 
objects.  Observers were shown an object with a randomly chosen hue and, after a delay, 
asked to choose from a color wheel what hue the object was. Such continuous report 
methods have been used with simple geometric shapes in working memory (e.g.,Wilken 
& Ma, 2004; Zhang & Luck, 2008; Brady & Alvarez, 2011), but have never been adapted 
for long-term memory. 
  Importantly, this method allows us to measure the fidelity of perception, working 
memory and long-term memory using a within-subject design. In the perception 
condition, observers had to match the color of a visible object. In the working memory 
condition, observers were given 3 seconds to encode 3 objects, and then had to report the 
colors of each object after a 1 second delay. We used three objects to match the set size at 
which working memory fidelity asymptotes (Zhang & Luck, 2008; Anderson et al. 2011). 
In the long-term memory condition, observers viewed hundreds of objects, presented one 
at a time, and then were asked to report the color of every single object, one at a time. In FIDELITY OF VISUAL MEMORY     6 
 
Experiment 1A, observers had 3 seconds to encode each object for the long-term memory 
condition, matching the total time that a display was visible in the working memory 
condition. In Experiment 1B we gave observers only 1 second to encode each object in 
the long-term memory condition, matching the time per-object in the working memory 
condition.  Observers saw different objects in each of the three conditions. 
Methods 
Participants 
14 observers (age range 18- 25) participated in Experiment 1 -- five in Experiment 1A 
and nine in 1B. They gave informed consent, and had normal color vision (assessed using 
Ishihara’s test for color deficiencies). All participants completed each of the three 
conditions, with the order randomized across participants.  
 
Apparatus 
Experiments were run in MATLAB using the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; 
Pelli, 1997), with stimuli presented on a 49° by 31° display, viewed from 57 cm.  
 
Stimuli 
540 pictures of categorically distinct objects were selected from Brady et al. (2008). The 
objects were chosen such that they consisted largely of a single arbitrary color (e.g., the 
object would be recognizable in any color; see Figure 1). Objects were rotated randomly 
in hue space, such that on each trial, the initial object color was determined by adding a FIDELITY OF VISUAL MEMORY     7 
 
random angle between 0 and 359 to the original hue. Each image appeared equally often 
in the three conditions. All stimuli subtended  ~6° of visual angle. 
 
Figure 1: Methods of Experiment 1. Observers were shown objects with their colors 
randomly rotated in hue, and asked to report the object’s color, either while it was still 
visible ([A] Perception), after a 1s delay ([B] Working Memory) or after seeing several 
hundred objects over 30 minutes ([C] Long-Term Memory). In Experiment 1A, the items 
in long-term memory were shown for 3s/item, in Experiment 1B for 1s/item.  
 
Perception Condition 
To assess the fidelity of color perception, participants performed a color-matching task 
(see Figure 1).  On each of the 180 trials, two copies of the same image were presented FIDELITY OF VISUAL MEMORY     8 
 
simultaneously, centered 5° left and right of fixation. The left image was the “standard” 
image, the right was the “test” image (initially in grayscale). The task was to adjust the 
color of the test item to match the standard.  
 
Working Memory Condition 
On each trial, three objects were simultaneously presented for 3s, in a circle around 
fixation. Participants were instructed to remember the color of all 3 objects. The objects 
disappeared for 1s, and then memory for the color of each item was tested one at a time 
in a randomly chosen sequence. Participants completed 60 trials, for a total of 180 tests.   
 
Long-Term Memory Condition 
Study Block. Participants viewed 232 images presented one at a time, for either 1s (1A) or 
for 3s (1B) each.  There was a 1s blank between images. Participants were instructed to 
remember the color and identity of each object as they viewed the images. During the 
study block, participants performed a repeat detection task to encourage them to maintain 
focused attention. Twenty-six images in the study stream appeared twice in a row, and 
participants responded by pushing the spacebar for the repeat.  Participants were given 
feedback only when they responded; with a red fixation cross indicating an incorrect 
response or a green fixation cross indicating a correctly detected repeat. No feedback was 
given for misses or correct rejections.   FIDELITY OF VISUAL MEMORY     9 
 
Test Block. Immediately after the study block, we tested the fidelity with which 
participants remembered the color of the objects.  Items that were repeated in the study 
stream were not tested, leaving 180 tested images.  
Continuous Report 
For each of the three conditions, participants’ color memory was measured using the 
method of adjustment. At the beginning of each test, the item appeared in grayscale and 
the mouse pointer appeared at the center of the item. When the participant moved the 
mouse, the test item appeared in color. The angle between the mouse and the center of the 
test item determined the item’s hue, and a dot was presented along the adjustment ring 
indicating the current position. When participants decided that the current color was 
correct, they clicked the mouse. The angular error was taken as a measure of the 
accuracy. The color wheel was randomly rotated across trials.  
Participants proceeded at their own pace and were asked to be as accurate as 
possible in their decisions. Feedback was given after accurate responses.  The words 
“good”, “great” or “perfect” appeared on the screen for errors of less than 10º, 5º or 0º.   
Data Analysis 
  On any given trial we measured error in degrees, between 0 (perfect memory) and 
+/- 180 degrees (poor memory). The histogram of errors over trials shows that most 
responses are centered around 0, but that across all responses there are errors distributed 
across the entire range (Figure 2).  This error histogram is well-fit by a mixture of two 
distributions: (1) a Gaussian-like distribution (defined on a circular space as a von Mises FIDELITY OF VISUAL MEMORY     10 
 
distribution), taken to reflect successful memory retrieval with some degree of precision, 
and (2) a uniform distribution, taken to reflect random guessing trials. Following Zhang 
and Luck (2008), this method allows us to separate trials in which the color was retrieved 
with some level of fidelity, and trials in which the color of the item was forgotten.  
  The fidelity of memory representation was estimated as the standard deviation 
(SD) of the von Mises distribution. The narrower the distribution appears around 0, the 
more precise the memory representation. The probability of guessing (PG) is estimated 
by the height of the uniform distribution. Maximum likelihood estimation was used to 
estimate these two parameters for each condition. 
    
Results  
Experiment 1A  
In the perception condition, observers were highly accurate, with a precision 
estimated at SD = 6.7° (+/- 0.8 S.E.M.) and the probability of guessing estimated at PG = 
0.0 (+/- 0.0 S.E.M.).  Thus, when the stimulus was present on the screen, observers’ 
never responded randomly and had a tight distribution centered on the correct color. 
In the working memory condition, in line with Zhang & Luck (2008), observers’ 
SD was 19.0° (+/- 1.3 S.E.M.) and guess rate PG was 0.09 (+/- 0.02 S.E.M.). This 
represents a major change in fidelity from perception to working memory: the SD 
increases by 183%, a serious cost in memory fidelity for having to hold the items in mind 
for several seconds (difference: t(4)=10.5; p<0.0001). 
In the long-term memory condition (with 3s/item), observers SD was 20.3° (+/- 
3.3 S.E.M.), with a guess rate, PG, of 0.58 (+/- 0.05 S.E.M.). The increase in guess rate FIDELITY OF VISUAL MEMORY     11 
 
from working memory was quite large, from 0.09 to 0.58 (t(4)=17.5, p<0.0001). 
However, surprisingly, the fidelity (SD) observed for 180 items in long-term memory 
was not significantly different from the fidelity (SD) observed for three items at a time in 
working memory (t(4)=-0.81; p=0.46). Note that the precision of working memory 
estimated here is similar to the precision observed across several working memory 
experiments testing memory for color patches at set sizes 3 and greater (Zhang & Luck, 
2008; Zhang & Luck, 2011) despite our use of real-world objects.   
 
Experiment 1B  
Observers had only 1s to encode the color of the item in long-term memory 
condition.  Despite this severe decrease in encoding time, Experiment 1B replicated 
Experiment 1A nearly exactly (see Figure 3). The fidelity (SD) in perception was 4.7° 
(+/- 0.5 S.E.M.), working memory was 17.8° (+/- 1.0 S.E.M.), long-term memory was 
19.3° (+/- 0.9 S.E.M.). The probabilities of guessing (PG) were 0.006 (+/- 0.002), 0.08 
(+/- 0.01) and 0.63 (+/- 0.05) respectively. As before, the fidelity of working memory and 
long-term memory were not significantly different (t(8)=1.0, p=0.33). In addition, there 
was no significant difference between the fidelity of long-term memory across the two 
experiments (t(12)=0.36, p=0.72).  Thus, the extra encoding time made no difference to 
the fidelity of color information in long-term memory. Combining results across 
Experiments 1A and 1B also did not result in a significant difference between the fidelity 
of working memory and long-term memory (means: 18.2, 19.7, t(13)=0.84, p=0.41). 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of errors for the perception, working memory, and 
long-term memory conditions, combining across Experiment 1A and Experiment 1B.  FIDELITY OF VISUAL MEMORY     12 
 
The summary of the fidelity and guessing parameters for each experiment are presented 
in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Results pooled across Experiments 1A and 1B. The histograms represent the 
error in observers’ responses for (A) Perception, (B) Working Memory, and (C) Long-
term Memory (pooled across all observers). While the fidelity of color representations 
decreases between perception and working memory, nearly all of the difference between 
working memory and long-term memory is driven by an increased guess rate. 
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Figure 3: Summary of results from Experiments 1A and 1B. While guess rate goes up 
significantly between working memory and long-term memory, the fidelity of long-term 
memory is comparable to that of working memory -- in spite of the need to represent 
many more items for a much longer duration, and the need for observers to encode and 
retrieve the items rather than keep them actively in mind. 
 
 
Discussion 
We measured the fidelity of color information in visual long-term memory in two 
studies, and compared it to the fidelity of working memory and perception.  The data 
show an extremely precise fidelity in perception (~5 degrees in hue), which falls off 
significantly in both working memory and long-term memory.  Surprisingly, the fidelity 
for color was comparable between working memory and long-term memory (standard 
deviation of ~20 degrees). This was true when long-term memory encoding times 
matched the total time (Experiment 1A) or the per-item time of the working memory FIDELITY OF VISUAL MEMORY     14 
 
condition (Experiment 1B).  The results showed that nearly all of the information loss 
from working memory to long-term memory is accounted for by an increased chance of 
entirely losing an item’s color from memory (increased guess rate).   
In the long-term memory condition, people must store hundreds of items for long 
durations and are required to encode and then retrieve them; whereas in the working 
memory condition, observers can keep items and their colors actively in mind. Despite 
these major differences between the two tasks, when holding 3 items in working memory, 
the fidelity of working memory and long-term memory are nearly identical. This 
indicates that observers have highly detailed long-term memory representations – even 
when using quantitative measures rather than qualitative forced-choice comparisons 
(Brady et al. 2008, Hollingworth, 2004). 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
It is possible that long-term memory and working memory have the same fidelity 
because long-term memory representations directly inherit their fidelity from working 
memory. For example, if items have to enter working memory to be encoded into long-
term memory, and if there is no further degradation of representations once encoded, then 
long-term memory representations would have exactly the same fidelity as working 
memory representations. While this is a possible account of our results, previous work 
has shown that the fidelity of visual working memory depends on the number of items 
remembered (Zhang & Luck, 2008; Wilken & Ma, 2004). Thus, because items in our 
long-term memory task were presented sequentially, one at a time, this inherited 
precision account would predict that the precision of long-term memory representations FIDELITY OF VISUAL MEMORY     15 
 
in Experiment 1 should match the fidelity of working memory for a single item. 
Experiment 1 cannot directly address this prediction, because multiple items were 
presented simultaneously in the working memory task. 
To address this inherited precision hypothesis, we matched the encoding 
conditions in the working memory and long-term memory conditions in Experiment 2. 
To preview the results, we found that observers can in fact remember a single item in 
working memory with better precision than long-term memory, which rejects the 
inherited precision account.  
 
 
Methods 
Participants 
Six observers participated in Experiment 2. None had previously participated in 
Experiment 1. All participants gave informed consent, were between the ages of 18 and 
25, and had normal color vision (assessed using Ishihara’s test for color deficiencies). 
 
Stimuli 
The stimuli were the same objects as in Experiment 1. 
 
 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1A, with the exception of the working 
memory condition, which was modified to consist of 180 trials with only a single item 
presented on each trial. Each object was presented for 3s and then tested after a 1s delay. 
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Results 
The perception (SD = 5.6°+/- 1.1, PG = 0.01 +/- 0.01) and long-term memory 
conditions (SD = 20.5°+/- 7.0, PG = 0.67 +/- 0.15) replicated the results from 
Experiments 1A and 1B.  However, working memory fidelity for 1 item was significantly 
better than long-term memory fidelity, given matched encoding conditions (SD=14.5° +/- 
1.3; t(5)=2.96, p=0.03).  In addition, comparing across experiments, the fidelity of 
working memory for 1 item was significantly better than the fidelity for 3 items 
(t(9)=2.45, p=0.03 and 1B: t(13)=2.06, p=0.06).  These results show that the precision of 
color information of real-world object stimuli is not fixed at encoding; it is possible for 
the fidelity of working memory to be better than the fidelity of long-term memory.  
 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 show that when a single real-world object is encoded, 
it has a higher fidelity representation in working memory than it will when it is later 
probed in long-term memory. This indicates that the fidelity of long-term memory is not 
directly inherited from working memory, and that there is additional degradation in long-
term memory that reduces the measured precision of retrieved items to 20 degrees.  
 FIDELITY OF VISUAL MEMORY     17 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The standard deviation (measure of fidelity) from all experiments plotted on a 
single axis. Perceptual fidelity is plotted for three different experiments (Experiments 1A, 
1B, and 2). Working memory fidelity is plotted as a function of the number of items on 
the display, for 1-item displays (Experiment 2), 3-item displays (Experiment 1A and 
Experiment 1B), and a 5-item display (Control Experiment 1). Long-term memory 
precision is plotted for 6 different experiments (Experiments 1A, 1B, 2; a control 
experiment with 360 items rather than 180; a control experiment with only 20 items; and 
a control experiment with verbal interference; see Supplemental Online Material). In line 
with previous work, we find that as you add more items to working memory, fidelity 
plateaus. Interestingly, the fidelity at which working memory reaches a plateau is the 
same as the fidelity estimated for visual long-term memory (highlighted with a gray 
zone). The solid line for working memory shows the fidelity as a function of set size. The 
dashed lines for perception and long-term memory indicate the mean standard deviation 
for those conditions. 
 
  Intriguingly, the data across all experiments show that the level at which working 
memory plateaus is identical to the fidelity observed in long-term memory (Figure 4). To 
bolster this finding, we conducted several control experiments (see also Supplemental 
Online Material). FIDELITY OF VISUAL MEMORY     18 
 
First, we tested working memory using displays with 5 items, to more clearly 
demonstrate the plateau in the fidelity of working memory over these 1-, 3-, and 5-item 
displays (Experiment C1, illustrated in Figure 4, green line).  Next, we asked whether we 
could make long-term memory precision worse than this limit. We reasoned that if we 
doubled the number of items in memory from 180 to 360, this might lead to less precise 
memories. However, we instead found that this manipulation only increased the 
probability of guessing, and the fidelity of the remembered item remained at about 
SD=20 degrees (Experiment C2).  Finally, we examined whether long-term memory 
precision could be more precise than this limit. We note that if long-term memory 
contained more precise memory representations, this would still be consistent with a limit 
on the fidelity of the memory representations. However, surprisingly we found that even 
with only 20 items in mind, precision was similar, and the benefit in overall performance 
was reflected with lower guessing rates than in the case of 180 or 360 items (Experiment 
C3). This result was also obtained when participants performed a verbal interference task 
(Experiment C4), suggesting this limit is unlikely due to a verbal coding strategy.  
In summary, across a very wide range of overall difficulty levels in the long-term 
memory task, where guess rates ranged from 26% to 73%, we find that fidelity remains 
constant at a standard deviation of 19-20 degrees. Any item more variable than this limit 
seems to be lost entirely to guessing, in both working memory and long-term memory.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Across several experiments, we find that observers lose significant precision in 
their representation of real-world objects when going from perception to working FIDELITY OF VISUAL MEMORY     19 
 
memory. However, the precision of three or four actively maintained representations in 
working memory is the same as that of hundreds of representations encoded and then 
retrieved from long-term memory. Thus long-term memory fidelity is significantly higher 
than previous believed, even when quantified using psychophysical methods.   
Furthermore, the fidelity of long-term memory is not directly inherited from the 
fidelity of representations at encoding, but instead seems to represent an asymptotic limit 
on the fidelity of items retrieved from memory: In working memory, as the number of 
items stored increases, fidelity plateaus with a standard deviation of about ~20 degrees. 
Similarly, when retrieving items from long-term memory, fidelity appears to degrade, but 
for remembered items fidelity does not get worse than a standard deviation of 
approximately 20 degrees, despite the necessity of representing more items for a longer 
duration and making use of an encoding and retrieval process rather than active storage. 
Additionally, this degree of fidelity is robust to a variety of long-term memory encoding 
durations, the number of objects stored, and the presence or absence of a verbal 
interference task. Thus, we suggest that a standard deviation of ~20 degrees may 
represent a limit on the fidelity of arbitrary color information that can successfully be 
retrieved from memory: any memory representations that degrade so that they have more 
variability than an SD of ~20 degrees seem to be irretrievable.  
This pattern of results suggests a dramatic reinterpretation of existing data from 
working memory: the plateau in working memory fidelity is likely not caused by factors 
intrinsic to working memory like the fidelity of a slot (Zhang & Luck, 2008, 2009; 
Anderson, Vogel & Awh, 2011) or the quantity of a resource (Bays et al. 2009), but is 
instead a general property of the memory encoding and retrieval system. That is, the FIDELITY OF VISUAL MEMORY     20 
 
fidelity of working memory and long-term memory may reflect an upper bound on how 
noisy a memory representation can be before it is unable to be retrieved. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Pictorial representation of the memory fidelity we observe in perception, 
working memory (3 items) and long-term memory. The central stimuli are the studied 
color, and the items next to them represent +/- 1 standard deviation (6 degrees in 
perception, 19 degrees in working memory for 3 items, 20 degrees in long-term memory). 
 
 
Relationship between working memory and long-term memory 
Several influential studies have found that working memory fidelity plateaus at a 
standard deviation of approximately 20 degrees (Zhang & Luck, 2008, 2009, 2011; 
Anderson et al. 2011; Anderson & Awh, 2012). In particular, fidelity does not seem to 
decrease when more than 3 or 4 items are encoded (Zhang & Luck, 2008), or when 
observers hold items for longer durations (Zhang & Luck, 2009). Based on this apparent 
asymptote in fidelity, these studies have concluded that working memory represents items 
with discrete slots that undergo catastrophic failures when items are held for long 
durations (Zhang & Luck, 2009). However, these explanations for why fidelity does not FIDELITY OF VISUAL MEMORY     21 
 
become worse are based entirely on models of active storage in working memory (slots, 
resources). For example, Zhang and Luck (2008) interpreted this asymptote as resulting 
from a limited number of memory slots, which maintain fixed-resolution representations 
in working memory. According to this theory, if you have 3 slots in memory, you could 
use them to represent < 3 items with more precision by allocating multiple slots per item, 
but after you had 3 items in memory you could no longer split your representations 
among more items, and so all subsequent items were simply not encoded. This failure to 
encode more than 3 items results in an increased guess probability but a flat fidelity 
asymptote as the number of items exceeds the number of slots. Other researchers have 
argued that the asymptote is a natural consequence of spreading a continuously divisible 
memory resource across multiple items, leading to decreased precision and an increased 
likelihood of forgetting items as set size increases (e.g., Wilken & Ma, 2004; Bays & 
Husain, 2008). 
However, our finding that long-term memory shares similar limits suggests an 
alternative model. Rather than this asymptotic fidelity limit reflecting an intrinsic 
property of the working-memory system, it may instead reflect a property of the broader 
memory system and factors that limit memory retrieval.  
 
Conclusion: Shared limits for an integrated visual memory system 
The broader working memory literature—particularly for verbal stimuli —has 
accumulated significant evidence for shared principles between short-term and long-term 
memory (Jonides et al., 2008; McElree, 2006; Nairne, 2002). For example, items 
putatively held in active storage are not accessed any faster than those held in passive FIDELITY OF VISUAL MEMORY     22 
 
storage (McElree, 2006). In addition, a number of empirical results highlight that 
working memory tasks do not solely isolate working memory mechanisms independent 
of long-term mechanisms. For example, performance on any given working memory trial 
is influenced by previous trials, including systematically induced biases and proactive 
interference (Huang & Sekuler, 2010; Hartshorne, 2008; Makovski & Jiang, 2008), 
suggesting an obligatory influence of long-term storage on working memory (Brady, 
Konkle, Alvarez, 2011; see also Olson et al. 2006, for evidence from neuroscience).  
The present empirical results showing that long-term memory fidelity is so high, 
and, in fact, equivalent to the asymptotic fidelity of working memory, leads us to propose 
a new link between working memory and long-term memory: both appear to have the 
same lower bound on memory fidelity. Recalled items never appear noisier than a fixed 
limit; after that limit, they are lost, perhaps unable to be retrieved for conscious access 
because they no longer sufficiently resemble the original memory trace that was laid 
down. 
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